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Knowledge of the Art of Governance: 
The Mughal and Ottoman Empires in the Early Seventeenth Century 
[Gagan D. S. Sood, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (2020)] 
 
Abstract 
 
This article seeks to reconstruct the prevailing concepts, images and principles that framed sovereign 
governance in the Mughal and Ottoman empires in the early seventeenth century. Little is known about the 
subject. To help fill the gap, two contemporaneous advice-to-kings treatises - one Mughal, one Ottoman - are 
analysed in juxtaposition. Such an analysis, never previously undertaken, is motivated and guided by a novel 
approach. In this approach, a model founded on near-universal conditions and problems is deployed within a 
regional perspective. The findings which result advance our understanding of the art of governance in the 
Mughal and Ottoman empires of the time. But they have a larger importance, too. They move us closer to 
achieving a break with the decline paradigm, whose logic still persists in mainstream interpretations. They also 
contribute to a more recent, and rapidly developing, interest in a region spanning much of South Asia and the 
Middle East that was formative for the global genesis of the modern world. 
 
Introduction 
 
 When Jahangir ascended the Mughal throne in 1605, he inherited a confident, 
purposeful empire. It had recently been consolidated around its base in northern India and 
was continuing to expand on multiple fronts. Not long into his reign, Jahangir ordered “one 
of the intimates of the court to collect the ḥadīths of the Prophet ... and bring [him] writings 
[on the subject] from everyone he has heard of”. “After much investigation and research”, 
the emissary came before ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Dihlavī. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, a devoted Sufi, was already 
known as a leading scholar, with many works to his name, particularly on ḥadīth. Earlier in 
his life, he had travelled extensively, with prolonged stays in Gujarat and the shrine city of 
Mecca. His travels allowed him to go on pilgrimage and study with some of the most 
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renowned scholars of his era. But once he had discovered “the hidden joyful tidings”, he 
returned to his homeland - “the familiar vaṭan” - of Delhi, and there he remained. Years 
later, when the intimate of Jahangir told him of the emperor’s command, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq 
divined its real value straightaway; it afforded a marvellous “opportunity ... to be able to 
stand in the imposing presence” of Jahangir and his court, and more importantly be 
listened to. He seized this opportunity, and went well beyond the strict remit of the 
original decree. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq “dared” to compose a treatise, the Risālah-i nūriyyah, “in the 
manner of the path of advice (naṣīḥat) and well-wishing”, which he then presented to 
Jahangir.1 
 
 While the Mughal heartlands during Jahangir’s reign were relatively secure, the 
same could not be said of the Ottoman heartlands of western Anatolia and the Balkans at 
                                                        
* Earlier versions of this article have benefitted greatly from the considered views of Antony M. Best, Leonard 
Blussé, Scott A. Boorman, Paul Keenan, Paul M. Kennedy, Noémi Lévy-Aksu, Rudolph Matthee, Patrick K. 
O’Brien, Ronald C. Po, Padraic X. Scanlan, Chander Shekhar, David Stevenson and Raphaël Taylor. I appreciate 
their willingness to engage with my research, and urge me on. 
 
** A note on transliteration. This article is based on sources in Persian and Ottoman. Many of the same key 
terms are used in both. Within direct quotations, these terms are transliterated in the system for their source 
language alone. In the general reasoning, they are transliterated in the systems for both languages in the 
order Persian/Ottoman (e.g., ḥuqūq/ḥuḳūḳ). Where a term in the general reasoning is transliterated only once, 
this is either because it is found solely in that language in the sources examined or because its transliteration 
is the same in both systems. An exception is made for ﺖﻟود due to the frequency with which this term figures 
in the article. To aid legibility, ﺖﻟود in the general reasoning is transliterated in the Persian system alone (so 
daulat, not daulat/devlet). Within direct quotations, however, the rule above applies.  
 
1 British Library, Delhi Persian 659b, ff. 12r, 1-13r, 7. 
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the time. In the early seventeenth century, these areas experienced a spate of rebellions 
and widespread banditry. The difficulties caused were aggravated by recent losses on the 
frontiers, to the Austrian Hapsburgs in the west and the Safavids in the east. Galvanised, 
“everyone was submitting his articles of thought and reflection” to Murad IV, the reigning 
emperor. Koçi Bey, courtier and government official, followed suit. He “too was quick to 
communicate and submit” his own treatise, the Risāle. This he did in the form of a series of 
headed memoranda (ruḳʿa-ı sevād-ı ʿünvān), which was presented to the emperor in 1630. A 
product of the devşirme, the regular levy of young boys for the capital from rural Christian 
populations, Koçi Bey had many years ago entered the palace service in Istanbul. There he 
spent the whole of his working life, during which he become close to Murad IV. In 1630, 
well before his retirement, “the extreme instability and evil and tumult and sedition and 
depravity” of the prevailing circumstances had made Koçi Bey’s “liver turn to blood”. These 
circumstances spurred him to investigate in his treatise not only “what is causing disorder 
in the world and causing changes to the situation of human beings”, but also “in what 
manner it is capable of being made sound”. None of this, Koçi Bey made a point of noting, 
was done “for my own happiness or to side with anyone in particular. [Rather], I am 
compelled to say that which benefits [the emperor and his regime] to the extent it reaches 
my feeble mind”.2 
 
 Both these treatises cleaved to a tradition deeply embedded within South Asia and 
the Middle East. The tradition was a vehicle for preserving, debating, crafting and 
disseminating knowledge deemed relevant to the art of governance by ruling elites. ʿAbd 
al-Ḥaqq’s Risālah-i nūriyyah and Koçi Bey’s Risāle are replete with concepts, images and 
principles that framed routine, high-level governance in the regimes of their time; they 
                                                        
2 Koçi Bey Risâlesi (Konstantiniye, 1303 [1885]), pp. 8, 1-3, 6-13; 100, 8-10, 17. 
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express the desired ends, near and far, to which these regimes were, or ought to be, 
oriented; they bear witness to the heuristics that oiled their official machinery. Such 
matters are crucial for apprehending the historical nature and function of any sovereign 
regime.3 This is undoubtedly true of the Mughal and Ottoman empires in the early 
seventeenth century, then the dominant sovereign realities in, respectively, the Indo-
Gangetic plain of northern India and the eastern Mediterranean basin. The empires also 
ranked as two of the early modern world’s greatest regimes on the basis of physical reach, 
material wealth, authoritative prestige, military power and sedentary population.4 Yet, a 
good understanding of such matters is still wanting for these empires. This article, by 
analysing in juxtaposition the contemporaneous treatises by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey, 
helps fill that gap. 
 
 For the early seventeenth century, and more generally for premodern times, 
scholarship on the art of governance in South Asia and the Middle East remains 
underdeveloped. In an influential work on kingship, Aziz al-Azmeh describes our 
knowledge of “medieval Muslim polities [as] almost uniformly poor. It is particularly 
wanting in the field of political theory”.5 This is not, however, for lack of interest. Indeed, 
interest in the subject is at present considerable and growing. That is so both among 
                                                        
3 Through a consideration of precolonial India, C. A. Bayly gives a stimulating account of the relationship 
between various kinds of knowledge and the art of governance in the prologue of his Empire and Information: 
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 10-55. 
4 The point is endorsed in all recent syntheses in the vein of world or global history. As an example, see C. A. 
Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford, 2004).  
5 A. al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan Polities (London, 1997), p. viii. 
A partial exception to al-Azmeh’s claim is scholarship on the history of Ottoman political thought and culture, 
discussed below. 
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specialists and among historians and historically-minded social scientists at large. The 
interest is being fanned by increasing recognition of the subject’s importance for 
recapturing basic dimensions of the early modern world. At the vanguard has been 
research on comparative economic development, plural modernities and imperial regimes.6 
This is intersected by work on mobilities, encounters, connexions and entanglements that 
transgress hitherto established boundaries in the historiography.7 Especially notable in this 
regard is the incipient field of global conceptual history, which promises to recapture the 
cognitive basis of not only circulations and exchanges that crossed various boundaries but 
also of the blockages and oppositions to them.8 All this research has the potential to 
                                                        
6 For an up-to-date summary of the contributions by economic historians, see T. Roy and G. Riello (eds.), Global 
Economic History (London, 2019). The question of plural modernities has been debated most tellingly in several 
special issues: ‘Early Modernities’, Daedalus 127:3 (1998); ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus 129:1 (2000); 
Modernity’, Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 40:4 (2007); ‘Historians and the question of 
“modernity”’, American Historical Review 116:3 (2011). Current work on the history of empires in comparative 
perspective is represented by S. E. Alcock et al. (eds.), Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History 
(Cambridge, 2001); J. Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London, 2007); A. L. Stoler, C. 
McGranahan and P. Perdue (eds.), Imperial Formations (Oxford, 2007); P. Turchin, ‘A theory for formation of 
large empires’, Journal of Global History 4:2 (2009), pp. 191-217; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires in World History: 
Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ, 2010). 
7 Prominent here is histoire croisée and global microhistory, developments in which are detailed in M. Werner 
and B. Zimmermann, ‘Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge of reflexivity’, History & Theory 
45:1 (2006), pp. 30-50; C. Douki and P. Minard, ‘Histoire globale, histoires connectées: un changement d’échelle 
historiographique?’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 54-4bis:5 (2007), pp. 7-21; ‘Global history and 
microhistory’, Past & Present 242, Issue Supplement 14 (2019). 
8 The promise of this incipient field can be gauged through A. Sartori, ‘The resonance of “culture”: Framing a 
problem in global concept-history’, 47:4 Comparative Studies in Society & History (2005), pp. 676-699; G. G. Iggers 
and Q. E. Wang, A Global History of Historiography (London, 2008); J. J. L. Gommans, ‘Empires and emporia: The 
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challenge (and transcend) standard views on the major polities of Eurasia over the past 
half-millennium.9 How in practice we comprehend the historical significance of these 
polities is via the narratives and paradigms embodying today’s received wisdom. This 
wisdom has possibilities and limitations, both of which the recent work in global history 
has thrown into sharp relief.  
 
 One of the principal concerns of global history is to understand the early modern 
‘step change’ that fundamentally transformed the capacities of human endeavour, with 
fateful consequences which endure down to the present. This secular phenomenon was 
driven, and arguably initiated too, by developments from the seventeenth century onwards 
within the three most populous, productive and powerful regions of the world - one 
extending from northwestern Europe into the Atlantic, a second centred on eastern China, 
and the third spanning much of South Asia and the Middle East. Cross-cutting 
developments internal to them were flows and interactions which enmeshed the regions in 
a shared globalisation.10 This thesis is, of course, anchored in a polycentric conception of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
orient in world historical space and time’, Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 53:1-2 (2010), pp. 
3-18. 
9 The two ends of the spectrum of views on these polities are typified by A. G. Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in 
the Asian Age (London, 1998) and D. S. Landes, Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor 
(London, 1998).  
10 For influential accounts of past globalisations, see J. R. McNeill and W. H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s-
Eye View of World History (New York, NY, 2003); C. S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its 
Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); J. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the 
Nineteenth Century (translated by P. Camiller, Princeton, NJ, 2014 [2009]). It should be noted that the scholarly 
literature in this field remains dominated by historians who are specialists on European empires, the Western 
world and/or modern times. Specialists on one or another part of the premodern East are conspicuous by 
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the world in the period, which has received a new lease of life in the field of global 
history.11 The resulting scholarship on the first two of these regions is voluminous and 
currently rationalised within the frameworks of, on the one hand, European 
Exceptionalism and, on the other hand, the Great Divergence.12 Scholarship on the third 
region, namely that of the present article, while not inconsiderable, falls short of its 
potential because it has yet to be framed appropriately.13 My approach, which as detailed in 
the next section combines a regional perspective with a model suited to reconstructing 
sovereign governance in complex polities, is intended as a contribution towards building 
                                                                                                                                                                            
their absence. On this point, see A. G. Hopkins, ‘The historiography of globalization and the globalization of 
regionalism’, Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient 53:1 (2010), pp. 19-36. 
11 Polycentricism underpins all the major studies in global history to date. In addition to those already noted, 
they include V. Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, vol. 1, Integration on the 
Mainland (Cambridge, 2003), vol. 2, Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands (Cambridge, 
2009); G. Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, NJ, 
2013). Though the polycentric concept has a venerable lineage—it is core to scholarship going back 
generations, exemplified by luminaries such as Fernand Braudel, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Charles Tilly, 
Immanuel Wallerstein and Eric Wolf—the present generation’s novelty lies in the ambition to take seriously 
developments in various parts of the world, and not to prejudge the origins or aetiology of these 
developments. 
12 The seminal works on these two frameworks are E. L. Jones, European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and 
Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (3rd edition, Cambridge, 2003 [1981]) and K. Pomeranz, Great 
Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ, 2000). Subsequent 
scholarship is surveyed, from different but complementary perspectives, in J. Bryant, ‘The West and the Rest 
revisited: Debating capitalist origins, European colonialism, and the advent of modernity’, Canadian Journal of 
Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 31:4 (2006), pp. 403-444 and S. Ghosh, ‘The “Great Divergence,” politics, 
and capitalism’, Journal of Early Modern History 18:6 (2014), pp. 1-43. 
13 For further details, see G. D. S. Sood, ‘Circulation and exchange in Islamicate Eurasia: A regional approach to 
the early modern world’, Past & Present 212 (2011), pp. 113-162. 
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just such a framework. Though further work is required, this agenda is worth persevering 
with. Achieving it will open the way to reconciling and integrating the bodies of 
scholarship rooted in the three regions. The history of the region treated here can then be 
put alongside and enter into fruitful conversation with the histories of the other two 
regions pivoting on northwestern Europe and eastern China. Doing so is a sine qua non for 
grasping the global genesis of the modern world.  
 
 Therefore, research from a regional perspective contributes to global scales. This is 
echoed by its contributions to humbler scales. The latter are facilitated by the general 
trend to elucidate and employ geographies in keeping with the past which escape the 
anachronistic binds of modern continents, area studies and states, and of ‘golden age’ 
civilisations and empires.14 The most relevant to this article are the Indo-Persian, 
Persianate and Islamicate worlds, and an emerging geography that bridges a longstanding 
historiographical divide between maritime Asia and continental Eurasia. Perhaps most 
importantly, research governed by such geographies can provide the additional grist 
needed for breaking decisively with the logic of the decline paradigm in interpreting the 
Mughal and Ottoman empires over the longue durée.15 In part, this is by recovering the 
                                                        
14 Arguments in favour of this trend are presented in M. W. Lewis and K. E. Wigen, Myth of Continents: A Critique 
of Metageography (Berkeley, CA, 1997); D. Ludden, ‘Presidential address: maps in the mind and the mobility of 
Asia’, Journal of Asian Studies 62:4 (2003), pp. 1057-1078; M. E. Bonine, A. Amanat and M. E. Gasper (eds.), Is There 
a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept (Stanford, CA, 2012). 
15 On the nineteenth-century historiographical roots of this paradigm and its enduring influence, see C. A. 
Bayly, ‘Religion, liberalism and empires: British historians and their Indian critics in the nineteenth century’ 
and B. Tezcan, ‘The New Order and the fate of the old - the historiographical construction of an Ottoman 
Ancien Régime in the nineteenth century’, in (eds.) P. F. Bang and C. A. Bayly, Tributary Empires in Global History 
(Houndmills, 2011), pp. 21-47, 74-95. 
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history of these empires on their own terms without being parochial. In part, it is by 
enabling a credible baseline for recapturing the continuities and changes that marked 
South Asia and the Middle East in moving from precolonial to colonial times, and hence the 
paths to modernity taken within the region.16 Though these goals have been familiar to 
specialists for more than a generation, we still have a long way to go to reach them. 
Scholarship on the art of governance is a case in point. 
 
 On the Mughal side, the pertinent literature is extremely limited in scope and 
depth.17 The existing scholarship on the subject is mostly due to Ottoman specialists. In 
some respects, this is highly developed; in others, as argued below, it is much less so.18 The 
scholarship is characterised by several broad tendencies. Predominantly focused on the 
metropolitan heartlands of the Ottoman empire, these tendencies may be differentiated by 
their interpretive framework and methodology. The oldest espouses the decline paradigm 
in the vein of intellectual history, within which the Ottoman empire is portrayed as 
idiosyncratic.19 The others, which have emerged since the 1980s, stand in opposition to that 
                                                        
16 This matter is discussed in the introduction to S. I. Pollock (ed.), Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern Asia: 
Explorations in the Intellectual History of India and Tibet, 1500–1800 (Durham, NC, 2011). 
17 The historical scholarship on the Mughal side is so limited that there is no meaningful debate, and thus 
overviews, to speak of. For the most substantive and stimulating set of contributions, we have to go back 
some forty years to J. F. Richards (ed.), Kingship and Authority in South Asia (Delhi, 1998 [1978]). 
18 For a detailed account, see H. Yılmaz, ‘Osmanlı tarihçiliǧinde Tanzimat öncesi siyaset düşüncesine 
yaklaşımlar’, Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 1:2 (2003), pp. 231-298. 
19 E.g. B. Lewis, ‘Ottoman observers of Ottoman decline’, Islamic Studies 1 (1962), pp. 71-87; P. Fodor, ‘State and 
society, crisis and reform, in 15th-17th century Ottoman mirror for princes’, Acta Orientalia Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae, 40:2-3 (1986), pp. 217-240. 
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paradigm. One is philological or semantic in nature,20 a second literary or discursive,21 and a 
third socio-political or political-economic.22 What these three more recent tendencies have 
in common is acute consciousness of the critique of declinism as an interpretive framework 
and a desire to relate Ottoman history positively to the past of other parts of the world, 
above all Europe.23 If we expand our horizons further, there comes into view an even larger 
body of work on themes that at least touch on high-level governance in the Mughal and 
Ottoman empires.24 Taken as a whole, this might suggest the picture is quite rosy. The 
historical scholarship now harbours a wealth of information on the state and its 
relationship to society across South Asia and the Middle East. That stems from research 
undertaken over the past two generations on specific places lying between the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean—the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia—at specific moments 
                                                        
20 E.g., R. Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 
1400-1800 (London, 2008); H. Yılmaz, Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought (Princeton, 
NJ, 2018). 
21 E.g., D. Howard, ‘Ottoman historiography and the literature of ‘decline’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries’, Journal of Asian History 22:1 (1988), pp. 52-76; H. L. Ferguson, The Proper Order of Things: Language, 
Power, and Law in Ottoman Administrative Discourses (Stanford, CA, 2018). 
22 E.g., R. A. Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Leiden, 1984); B. Tezcan, The 
Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge, 2010). 
23 For a good overview, see D. Quataert, ‘Ottoman history writing and changing attitudes towards the notion 
of “decline”’, History Compass (2003), pp. 1-9. 
24 This research is critically surveyed in S. Ghosh, ‘How should we approach the economy of “early modern 
India”?’, Modern Asian Studies 49:5 (2015), pp. 1606-1656; R. Travers, ‘The eighteenth century in Indian history’, 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 40:3 (2007), pp. 492-508; A. Mikhail and C. M. Philliou, ‘The Ottoman empire and the 
imperial turn’, Comparative Studies in Society & History 54:4 (2012), pp. 721-745; J. Hathaway, ‘Rewriting 
eighteenth-century Ottoman history’, Mediterranean Historical Review 19:1 (2004), pp. 29-53; P. J. Stern, ‘History 
and historiography of the English East India Company’, History Compass 7:4 (2009), pp. 1146-1180. 
11 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. This research has unlocked a myriad of 
stories which draw on a much more expansive suite of concepts, methods and sources than 
before. 
 
 But in their essentials these stories do not supersede their antecedents. The fields to 
which they contribute—particularly the Ottoman empire after Süleyman (r. 1520-1566) and 
the Mughal empire from the latter part of Aurangzeb’s reign (r. 1658-1707)—have for some 
years been monopolised by analyses of two types: those that elaborate transformations 
between one age and another, intersected by crises and bouts of institutional reform; and 
those that highlight the growing dispersion of power among the ruling elites and towards 
the provinces and the frontiers, by virtue of flexible, adaptive social networks, which 
supported the rise of local magnates and their successor regimes. It is undeniable that the 
details of these stories differ from the earlier ones of decline (followed by European 
colonialism or dominance). However—and this is the crucial point—they remain beholden 
to the earlier logic. That is to say, their details are predicated on the devolution of 
sovereignty away from Istanbul or Delhi, and framed by narratives whose end point is the 
high-noon of European imperialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It follows 
axiomatically that, despite having been so heavily critiqued, the mainstream historical 
scholarship can offer no meaningful alternative to the older, inherited paradigm of decline. 
The engagement with that paradigm is at best agnostic; at worst it is unwittingly 
reinforced. This situation persists chiefly because of the constraints which characterise the 
approaches that have been adopted thus far. They confine attention either to matters 
wholly internal to a given empire, or to its parallels and linkages with Europe or a 
European-centred world economy. Hence, prevailing interpretations of both the Mughal 
12 
and Ottoman empires are either parochial and idiosyncratic, or defined in terms of 
European Exceptionalism and the Rise of the West.25 
 
Approach and Sources 
 
 In order to escape these constraints, the approach of this article differs qualitatively 
from those adopted to date. Two contemporaneous advice-to-kings treatises are analysed 
in juxtaposition, that is to say in a reciprocally comparative manner. What distinguishes 
such an analysis from others is the absence of European historical experience as a 
referent.26 Rather, it is the Mughal and Ottoman polities alone which lie on the two sides of 
the comparison. The choice of these is motivated by the claim, widely embraced by 
scholars, that their dominant sovereign regimes - the Mughal and Ottoman empires - 
belonged to a shared category.27 For our analysis, this has the advantage of greatly reducing 
the number of variables in play. The comparison is further motivated by the existence of a 
                                                        
25 C. Markiewicz critically assesses the Europeanist orientation of Ottomanists in his ‘Europeanist trends and 
Islamicate trajectories in early modern Ottoman history’, Past & Present 239 (2018), pp. 265-281. 
26 The present interest in the reciprocal comparisons method is due to the debate over the Great Divergence. 
For details, see R. B. Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, NY, 
1997), pp. 1-7; K. Pomeranz, Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton, NJ, 2000), p. 8; R. B. Wong, ‘Early modern economic history in the long run’, Science & Society 68:1 
(2004), pp. 80–90; G. Austin, ‘Reciprocal comparison and African history: Tackling conceptual eurocentrism in 
the study of Africa’s economic past’, African Studies Review 50:3 (2007), pp. 1-28. The manner in which the 
method is implemented here by necessity differs from its formulation within the context of the Great 
Divergence debate. This is because the parallels and linkages between the Mughal and Ottoman polities of the 
time were of a much higher order compared to those prevailing between Europe and China. 
27 In the conclusion below, I return to the issue of the category of regime to which the Mughal and Ottoman 
empires belonged. 
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coherent, distinct and autonomous region that spanned much of South Asia and the Middle 
East into the nineteenth century. This region was defined by an array of family 
resemblances and mutual dependencies. The family resemblances, which generations of 
scholars have reflected upon and sought to substantiate, were of several kinds, including 
ontological,28 genealogical,29 infrastructural,30 sovereign,31 artistic32 and scholarly.33 The 
mutual dependencies are most clearly discernible through complementarities between the 
region’s polities from the standpoint of the Arid Zone or, more generally, physical 
                                                        
28 E.g., M. G. S. Hodgson, Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3 vols (Chicago, 1974); M. 
Alam and S. Subrahmanyam, Indo-Persian Travels in the Age of Discoveries, 1400–1800 (Cambridge, 2007); G. D. S. 
Sood, India and the Islamic Heartlands: An Eighteenth-Century World of Circulation and Exchange (Cambridge, 2016). 
29 E.g., A. al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan Polities (London, 1997); A. 
A. Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (New York, 2012); A. Anooshahr, 
Turkestan and the Rise of Eurasian Empires: A Study of Politics and Invented Traditions (Oxford, 2018); J. J. L. 
Gommans, ‘The warband in the making of Eurasian empires’, in (eds.) M. Berkel and J. Duindam, Prince, Pen, 
and Sword: Eurasian Perspectives (Leiden, 2018), pp. 297-383. 
30 E.g., R. W. Bulliet, The Camel and The Wheel (New York, 1990 [1975]); K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: 
Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990); G. D. S. Sood, ‘The 
informational fabric of eighteenth-century India and the Middle East: Couriers, intermediaries and postal 
communication’, Modern Asian Studies 43:5 (2009), pp. 1085-1116. 
31 E.g., H. Berktay, ‘Three empires and the societies they governed: Iran, India and the Ottoman empire’, in 
(eds.) H. Berktay and S. N. Faroqhi, New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History (London, 1992), pp. 
247-263; F. Robinson, The Mughal Emperors and the Islamic Dynasties of India, Iran, Central Asia, 1206-1925 (London, 
2007). 
32 E.g., G. Necipoğlu, ‘Framing the gaze in Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal palaces’, Ars Orientalis 23 (1993), pp. 
303-342; S. Blair and Jonathan Bloom, The Art and Architecture of Islam, 1200-1800 (New Haven, CT, 1994). 
33 E.g., F. Robinson, ‘Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared knowledge and connective systems’, Journal of Islamic 
Studies 8:2 (1997), pp. 151-184; S. Reichmuth, The World of Murtaḍa al-Zabīdī (1732-91): Life, Networks and Writings 
(Cambridge, 2009). 
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geography.34 In analysing the two treatises below, this regional perspective is invaluable for 
distancing us from eurocentric yardsticks, shielding us from unwarranted essentialisations 
and path dependencies, and enabling us to sidestep anachronistic premises.35  
 
 To make the reciprocal comparison robust as well as practicable, a model is needed 
that, heuristically, allows us to differentiate between historical constants and historical 
contingencies.36 The model deployed here is founded on the truism that anything of man-
made significance is at root about social power.37 Power is, of course, an abstraction which 
cannot be observed per se. But it is rendered observable through the functioning of 
resources—natural endowments, cognitive patterns, social actors and institutional 
mechanisms—marshalled to articulate it. That points to the two fundamental aspects of 
power: its anatomy and physiology, or, simply put, what is there and how it works. These 
two aspects are in reality inextricably entwined. But for analytical purposes they may be 
treated separately, as done in this article. Each aspect is characterised by certain near-
                                                        
34 For details on the region’s environment as historically formative, see J. J. L. Gommans, ‘The silent frontier of 
South Asia, c. A.D. 1100-1800’, Journal of World History 9:1 (1998), pp. 1-23; A. Wink, ‘From the Mediterranean to 
the Indian Ocean: Medieval history in geographic perspective’, Comparative Studies in Society & History 44:3 
(2002), pp. 416-445; F. Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach (Baltimore, 
2008). 
35 A very recent plea for historical scholarship unshackled from “cognitive eurocentrism” is made in R. 
Drayton and D. Motadel, ‘Discussion: The futures of global history’, Journal of Global History 13:1 (2018), pp. 1-21. 
36 The need for models for credible analyses of this kind has long been recognised. From an earlier generation, 
see R. Owen, ‘Introduction [to part two]’, in (eds.) T. Naff and R. Owen, Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic 
History (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1977), pp. 133-151 and R. A. Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: 
The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (2nd edition, Albany, NY, 2006 [1991]). 
37 M. Mann elaborates this point in arguing for “societies as organized power networks” in Sources of Social 
Power, vol. 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 1-33.  
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universals. For complex polities—polities that were citied, literate and commercialised, not 
least those of the Mughals and Ottomans—the near-universals take the form of anatomical 
‘conditions’ and physiological ‘problems’. Conditions refer to the basic resources that were 
available and moreover known in a polity,38 whereas problems refer to the core needs of 
associational life met through marshalling specific resources.39 All complex polities have 
historically been defined by the same conditions and confronted the same problems. In a 
given context, however, like that of the Mughal or Ottoman metropole in the early 
seventeenth century, a particular subset of these conditions and problems were invoked by 
contemporaries as consequential. By doing so, this subset was crystallised as ‘structures’ 
and ‘solutions’. Because these structures and solutions were grounded in given contexts, 
they are thus amenable to empirical research. So the model deployed here directs attention 
to, on the one hand, the structures out of which the historically consequential conditions 
were fashioned and, on the other hand, the solutions which addressed the historically 
consequential problems.40 
                                                        
38 For complex polities, the near-universal conditions of power are centralised institutions, a ruling ideology, 
indirect rule and plural populations. 
39 For complex polities, the near-universal problems of power turn on loyalty, intelligence, chains-of-
command, succession, revenue, rights, justice, dispute resolution, resource distribution, public works, 
population size, social welfare, reputation, security, livelihood, strangers, aliens, memory and unity. 
40 The model outlined here is derived from a consideration of the character and trajectory of complex polities 
about which we possess recorded evidence. To that end, I have found particularly helpful D. E. Brown, Human 
Universals (New York, 1991); D. Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley, CA, 2004); P. 
Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies (Oxford, 1989); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 
1963); S. E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, 3 vols (Oxford, 1997); E. Gellner, Plough, Sword 
and Book: the Structure of Human History (Chicago, 1988); M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, 4 vols (Cambridge, 
1986-2013); J. L. Martin, Social Structures (Princeton, NJ, 2009); R. M. Unger, Plasticity into Power, vol. 3, 
Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional Conditions of Economic and Military Success (Cambridge, 1987). 
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 The foregoing summarises the approach adopted in this article. It permits the 
reconstruction of key features of the Mughal and Ottoman arts of governance before the 
onset of European domination. Documentary sources are essential for this at the level of 
the day-to-day practice of sovereign governance.41 But because of their more reflective, 
capacious and future oriented character, a certain corpus of literary sources have greater 
immediate relevance to the subject of this article. These were generally written by and for 
the regime’s elites, and are of four main types: 
 
type I sources, exemplified by the akhlāq/aḫlāḳ (‘ethics’) genre, which advocated 
qualities for individuals and groups within the polity whose realisation would move it 
closer to an often salvationist ideal;42 
 
type II sources, exemplified by the naṣīḥat (‘advice’) genre, which aimed to sustain and 
where possible improve the regime’s well-being by describing the current situation of 
the polity and offering proposals for handling issues of topical concern;43 
 
                                                        
41 Historians of the Ottoman empire, much more so than those of the Mughal empire, are in the fortunate 
position of having at their disposal a huge quantity of official records to have survived from the fifteenth 
century onwards. Such documentary riches have their own pitfalls, however, which are tellingly discussed in 
H. Berktay, ‘The search for the peasant in Western and Turkish history/historiography’, in (eds.) H. Berktay 
and S. N. Faroqhi, New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History (London, 1992), pp. 109-184. 
42 S. A. Arjomand, ‘The salience of political ethic in the spread of Persianate Islam’, Journal of Persianate Studies 
1:1 (2008), pp. 5-29. 
43 L. Marlow, ‘Advice and advice literature’, in (eds.) K. Fleet et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE (consulted 
online on 15 November 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_0026). 
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type III sources, exemplified by the dastūr al-ʿamal (‘rules of work’) and ḳānūn (‘law’) 
genres, which facilitated the administration of the regime’s machinery by supplying 
bureaucratic guidelines and handbooks;44 and 
 
type IV sources, exemplified by epistolary collections, biographies and histories, which 
provided edification through communicating the character and fate of noteworthy past 
regimes and their ruling elites.45 
 
Much of the scholarship by Ottomanists on the art of governance has been stimulated by 
the first two of these types. Because of the extensive overlap between them, they are often 
grouped together and described as ‘advice-to-kings’ treatises.46 From the mid sixteenth 
century, a substantial number of works in this vein were produced in the Ottoman 
metropole.47 Among Mughalists, scholars interested in the art of governance have generally 
relied on the third and fourth types of sources. This reflects the apparent paucity of advice-
                                                        
44 J. Sarkar, Mughal Administration (3rd edition, Calcutta, 1935), pp. 258-261; I. Habib, The Agrarian System of 
Mughal India, 1556-1707 (3rd edition, New Delhi, 2013 [1963]), pp. 468-471; H. İnalcık, ‘Ḳānūnnāme’, in (ed.) P. 
Bearman, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (consulted online on 15 November 2018, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0440); H. W. Lowry, ‘The Ottoman Liva Kanunnamesi 
contained in the Defter-i Hakani’, Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi 2 (1981), pp. 43-74. 
45 O. Kondo, The Early Modern Monarchism in Mughal India (With a Bibliographical Survey) (New Delhi, 2014 [2012]), 
pp. 231-276; S. N. Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge, 1999). 
46 The scholarship based on such treatises is reviewed in M. Sariyannis, A History of Ottoman Political Thought up 
to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden, 2018). 
47 For a useful description of these works, glossed as islahatnâmeler, see C. Yılmaz, ‘Osmanlı siyaset düşünçesi 
kaynakları ile ilgili yeni bir kavramsallaştırma: Islahatnâmeler’, Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 1:2 (2003), 
pp. 299-338. 
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to-kings treatises produced in Mughal India.48 The noted historian John F. Richards went so 
far as to opine, “High level policy debate - never a strong point within the [Mughal] system 
- was pallid and ineffectual. Unlike contemporary Ottoman practice, we find no examples of 
clearly stated memorials to the throne”.49 
 
 The mere fact this article could be written shows that Richards overstated the case. 
Motivated and guided by the approach outlined above, the following section presents an 
analysis in juxtaposition of the two advice-to-kings treatises introduced at the beginning of 
the article. They have been chosen for being situated in, and relatively open about, the 
Mughal and Ottoman worlds of the early seventeenth century. No other pair of surviving 
advice-to-kings treatises is better suited to the task of a synchronic comparison of the art 
of governance in these two worlds.50 The first, entitled Risālah-i nūriyyah, was composed in 
Persian by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Dihlavī (1551-1642), and dedicated to the Mughal ruler Jahangir (r. 
1605-1627).51 The other, entitled Risāle, was composed in Ottoman by Koçi Bey (d. circa 
                                                        
48 Only four such treatises are known to have been written between the reign of Akbar (r. 1556-1605) and that 
of Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). Brief details on these are given in S. S. Alvi, Advice on the Art of Governance: 
Mauʾizah-i Jahāngīrī of Muḥammad Bāqir Najm-i Sānī: An Indo-Islamic ‘Mirror for Princes’ (Albany, NY, 1989), pp. 9-
11, 29-30. 
49 J. F. Richards, The Mughal Empire (Cambridge, 1993), p. 290. 
50 Such an analysis could, of course, be extended by carrying out diachronic comparisons with earlier and 
later treatises in the same vein. Though that lies beyond the scope of this article, it is a desiderata for future 
research on the region’s history. 
51 On ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s life, see K. A. Niẓāmī, Ḥayāt-i Shaykh ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dihlavī (Delhi, 1964); S. Kugle, 
‘ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dihlavī’, in (eds.) K. Fleet et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE (consulted online on 18 
November 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_24147). Though ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s treatise is 
undated, it was most likely written and presented in the 1610s. Jahangir’s accession in 1605 gives its dating a 
lower bound. As the treatise suggests that its author had never met Jahangir in person at the time of writing, 
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1650), and dedicated to the Ottoman ruler Murad IV (r. 1623-1640).52 The authors of Risālah-i 
nūriyyah and Risāle resided in their imperial metropoles, and were recognised members of 
their respective elites. Though not remarked upon as makers or implementers of sovereign 
decisions in their own right, they were of high enough status to observe from close 
quarters the functioning of their regime’s governing machinery. They were also high 
enough in status for their opinions to circulate among, and be given credence by, elite 
contemporaries.53 Despite its exceptional value for Mughal history, Risālah-i nūriyyah has, to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
an upper bound is provided by November 1619. That is when Jahangir received ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq at court, as 
recounted in his own memoirs, the Jahāngīrnāmah (The Jahangirnama: Memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India, 
translated, edited, and annotated by W. M. Thackston, New York, 1999, p. 316). Given these facts, it is probable 
Risālah-i nūriyyah was written in the years leading up to this audience, and perhaps even helped pave the way 
for it. 
52 On Koçi Bey’s life, see M. Ç. Uluçay, ‘Koçi Bey’, İslam Ansiklopedisi (1954), pp. vi, 832-835; Ö. F. Akün, ‘Koçi 
Bey’, TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, (2002), pp. xxvi, 143-148. 
53 The immediate impact of their opinions as found in these treatises is a matter about which unfortunately 
we remain mostly in the dark. That there was interest in them is testified to by the existence of multiple 
manuscript copies of all or parts of the original treatises made in the seventeenth and later centuries. 
Furthermore, as the reasoning of the treatises remained well within the bounds of ‘safe criticism’ or, 
alternatively, ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, thereby expressing loyal opposition, the circle of 
prospective readers among the ruling elites was presumably maximised. For the registers in which loyal 
opposition could be aired, see R. A. Abou-El-Haj, ‘The expression of Ottoman political culture in the Literature 
of advice to princes (nasihatnameler), sixteenth to twentieth centuries’, in (eds.) R. K. Bhattacharya and A. K. 
Ghosh, Sociology in the Rubric of Social Science: Professor Ramkrishna Mukherjee Felicitation Volume (New Delhi, 
1995), p. 282; M. Sariyannis, ‘Ottoman ideas on monarchy before the Tanzimat reforms: Toward a conceptual 
history of Ottoman political notions’, Turcica 47:1 (2016): pp. 59-61. On what the memorandum form taken by 
Ottoman advice-to-kings treatises implies about their readership, see R. Murphey, ‘The Veliyüddin Telhis: 
Notes on the sources and interrelations between Koçi Bey and contemporary writers of Advice to Kings’, 
20 
the best of my knowledge, never before been analysed as a historical source. Indeed, its 
existence is barely acknowledged in modern scholarship.54 That is in marked contrast to 
Koçi Bey’s Risāle, which has long been familiar to scholars as a notable work in the genre, 
especially for its policy orientation. It exists in several editions.55 
 
 These two treatises cover themes considered important for their proximate milieu. 
Because of the background, circumstances and interests of their authors, it is reasonable to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Belleten 43 (1979), pp. 547-571; D. Howard, ‘Genre and myth in the Ottoman advice for kings literature’, in V. H. 
Aksan and D. Goffman, The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 150-151. 
54 I chanced upon this treatise while leafing through an unpublished catalogue that contained references to 
two eighteenth-century manuscripts held in the British Library. On further enquiry, these turned out to be 
slightly different copies of the original, early seventeenth-century Risālah-i nūriyyah, which no longer appears 
to be extant. For details on these copies (and a third, much later copy held in a collection in Peshawar, 
Pakistan), see the introduction (in Persian) to Shaykh ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Muḥaddith Dihlavī, Risālalah-i nūriyyah-i 
sulṭāniyyah (introduced, edited and annotated by M. S. Akhtar, Islamabad, 1985). The analysis of this article is 
based on the earliest of the three known copies. This was made in 1736 and is today preserved in the British 
Library under the class mark Delhi Persian 659b. The reason for its selection is not because of its closeness in 
date to the original treatise but because it is the only copy to have been made before the devastation wrought 
on Delhi and the traditional Mughal heartlands by the military campaigns of Nādir Shāh and Aḥmad Shāḥ 
from the end of the 1730s through to the 1760s; the other copies were made after these events, and are thus 
less likely to be faithful to the original treatise.  
55 For details on Risāle’s manuscript copies and printings, as well its translations, see S. Çakmakcıoğlu (ed.), 
Koçi Bey Risaleleri (Istanbul, 2008), pp. 17-18. Due to lack of precision and inconsistences in the modern 
translations currently found in Russian, German, Hungarian and Turkish—modern translations into English or 
French have yet to appear—I base the analysis in the following section on my own translation of the well-
known transcribed edition of the original treatise published in 1885 by Ebüzziya Tevfik. The modern 
scholarship on Koçi Bey and his Risāle is noted in M. Sariyannis, Ottoman Political Thought up to the Tanzimat: A 
Concise History (Rethymno, 2015), pp. 84-85. 
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take the treatises as representative of commonplace views regarding sovereign governance 
among the corporate body of elites to which the authors themselves belonged. The 
treatises both elucidate and reflect their own polities from the standpoint of the imperial 
metropole. Adopting the approach of this article allows us to analyse the two in 
juxtaposition so as to access the reservoir of knowledge tapped by high-level Mughal and 
Ottoman officials in the early seventeenth century. Though this knowledge imbues their 
reasoning, it is not obvious from a casual reading. Rather, it has to be systematically 
reconstructed, and this can only be done by deploying a model for differentiating historical 
constants and contingencies. Such a model is central to the approach of this article. By 
deploying it within a regional perspective, we learn in particular about the endowments, 
patterns, actors and mechanisms—resources, for short—that were available and known to 
contemporaries, and deemed historically consequential for their regimes. We also learn 
about how these resources could or should be marshalled in order to deal with specific 
problems thought critical for the well-being of those regimes. 
 
 The biographical differences between ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey are compounded, 
as noted in the opening section, by the differences in the situation of their respective 
empires in the early seventeenth century.56 Differences between the two treatises are thus 
only to be expected. This is seen most clearly in the problems highlighted by the authors as 
especially significant or pressing, and the solutions—articulated variously as remedies 
(ʿilāj/ʿilāc, chārah/çāre, davā/devā), preparations (tadāruk/tedārük), improvements (iṣlāḥ) or 
corrections (taṣḥīḥ)—discussed to address them. In Risālah-i nūriyyah, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq stressed 
                                                        
56 The most recent overviews are C. Lefèvre, Pouvoir impérial et élites dans l’Inde moghole de Jahāngīr (Paris, 2018); 
B. Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge, 
2010). 
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above all tax demands on the general population (revenue problem), unity of purpose 
among officials and within the army (intelligence and chains-of-command problems), and 
dissemination of inherited past experience for effective sovereign governance in the 
present (memory problem). Koçi Bey, whose Risāle was principally concerned with the 
regime’s bureaucracy and army, placed greatest stress on patronage channelling obedience 
(chains-of-command problem), venality dictating recruitment into the governing 
machinery (succession problem), the metropole as a clearing house for allocating income 
(revenue problem), and legitimate and illegitimate qualifications for official posts 
(strangers problem). 
 
 Without diminishing their importance, the focus of this article’s analysis is not on 
the specific problems stressed by the authors of the two treatises.57 It aims instead to 
recover the structures that conditioned routine, high-level governance in the Mughal and 
Ottoman empires of the time. This cannot be done merely by describing or summarising 
the two treatises. It is here that the problems come into their own: due to the 
interconnectedness of conditions and problems, the problems stressed by the authors offer 
a way of getting at the conditions. The treatises orient the reader towards the problems of 
acutest concern to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey because of their innate significance or of 
their pressing nature. This then enables us to reconstruct their knowledge of the basic 
resources—expressed as concepts, images and principles—for the purposes of governing 
                                                        
57 There is an extensive body of scholarship on how the two empires addressed such problems from the 
perspective of the centre. Among Mughalists, this is primarily due to the remarkable feats of the ‘Aligarh 
School’ historians, whose leading and most fruitful proponent was Irfan Habib. As for Ottoman studies, the 
field has been blessed by a sizeable number of historians over the generations. The most seminal of those to 
have adopted a problems-oriented approach include Halil Inalcık, Mehmet Genç and Rifaʿat A. Abou-El-Haj. 
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from the centre. Taken as a whole, these give us a tangible purchase on the principal 
structures of Mughal and Ottoman metropolitan rule in the early seventeenth century. 
 
Risālah-i nūriyyah and Risāle: The Analysis 
 
 Risālah-i nūriyyah and Risāle are replete with knowledge germane to sovereign 
governance. This knowledge is at root divided between that bearing on the essential nature 
of the cosmos (universal knowledge) and that vested in the world of the here-and-now 
(temporal knowledge). Given the weighting of the text, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey were 
mainly interested in the latter. But this does not gainsay the influence of the former, which 
shaped their approach to everything else.  
 
 The treatises depict the cosmos as consisting of this world (dunyā/dünyā) and the 
next world (ākhirat, ʿuḳbā), both created by God.58 “The life-course (zindigānī) of this world 
and the transient life (ḥayāt-i mustaʿār) does not compare with the eternal kingdom (mulk-i 
jāvdānī) and the divine, restful paradise (naʿīm dhā al-qarār)”.59 But alongside paradise there 
is also the prospect of “the fires of hell (cehennem)”.60 Which of them lies in store for an 
individual is determined on the day of judgement (qaḍā, jizā), the bridge between the two 
worlds. Each individual’s death (marg) has been predestined by God, and it is on that day 
and that day alone his life will be judged.61 “Whoever devotes himself to the path of God 
                                                        
58 British Library, Delhi Persian 659b (hereafter, ‘AH’), f. 14r, 1-3; Koçi Bey Risâlesi (Konstantiniye, 1303 [1885]) 
(hereafter, ‘KB’), p. 63, 8-10. 
59 AH, 22v, 11-12. Also see KB, 67, 7-9. 
60 KB, 63, 10-11. 
61 AH, 22v, 1-11. 
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(khudā), and supporting and strengthening religion (dīn)” shall be granted by God “the 
eternal kingdom and eternal life (ḥiyāt-i abadī). What could be a more profitable bargain 
than that?”62 All temporal existence is girded, however, by the resurrection 
(qiyāmat/ḳıyāmet) at the end of time, which will be foreshadowed by “the disunity of a 
world in confusion”.63  
 
 These perceived realities—the next world, the day of judgement, the resurrection— 
are foundational for the authors’ understanding of the cosmos. But they are not dwelt 
upon; they are treated as background presences. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s and Koçi Bey’s proximate 
concern was with the situation of this world. That in turn was tied to what lay within the 
scope of fortune (ṭāliʿ, iqbāl/iḳbāl, bakht/baḫt) and what lay within the scope of human 
agency.64 The significance of these notions derived from the ability of both to affect this 
world, the most salient parts of which were conceived as the polity, general population, 
regime, elites and ruler.  
 
 The overall situation of this world was revealed through the current state of the 
daulats and salṭanats to which it played host. These terms are frequently invoked in both 
treatises,65 and are core to the reasoning, not just because they frame their author’s 
                                                        
62 AH, 22v, 13-23r, 3. 
63 AH, 11r, 10-12. Also see KB, 39, 2-3; KB, 101, 8-10. 
64 AH, 11v, 2-4; KB, 32, 7-8. 
65 In ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s Risālah-i nūriyyah, daulat is mentioned explicitly 18 times and salṭanat 24 times over 40 
pages (20 folios). In Koçi Bey’s Risāle, daulat is mentioned explicitly 85 times and salṭanat 24 times over 118 
pages. 
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principal interests but also because they render them intelligible.66 As used by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq 
and Koçi Bey, however, these terms are difficult if not impossible to translate directly into 
terms familiar to us today. Daulat and salṭanat have historically enjoyed wide currency in 
the many languages of the region, not least Arabic, Persian, Ottoman, Hindi and Urdu. And 
they continue to do so today. Daulat is commonly apprehended as ‘government’, ‘state’ and 
‘country’, with additional senses of ‘wealth’ and ‘felicity’. Salṭanat is commonly 
apprehended as ‘sultanate’, ‘dominion’ and ‘power’. While these meanings today overlap 
with the meanings given them in the treatises, the mapping is neither simple nor clear. So 
as not to misconstrue them, their meanings in the early seventeenth century are discerned 
here not by translating them directly, but through their functioning within the treatises. 
 
 Daulat and salṭanat are often invoked as autonomous concepts: “the powerful 
majesty of the daulat”,67 “the devlet being in perfect strength”,68 “the elevator of the throne 
                                                        
66 Despite the centrality of daulat and salṭanat to understandings of sovereign governance at the time, the 
modern scholarship on these as socio-political concepts is threadbare. What exists is of greatest value for its 
suggestive qualities. The main contributions include R. Savory, ‘The Safavid state and polity’, Iranian Studies 
7:1-2 (1974), pp. 179-212; R. A. Abou-El-Haj, ‘The nature of the Ottoman state in the latter part of the XVIIth 
century’, in (ed.) A. Tietze, Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen (Vienna, 1985), pp. 171-185; al-Azmeh, Muslim 
Kingship, pp. 110-113; M. Athar Ali, ‘The state in Islamic thought in India’, in ibid., Mughal India: Studies in Polity, 
Ideas, Society and Culture (New Delhi, 2006), pp. 121-124; N. Sigalas, ‘Devlet et etat: du glissement sémantique 
d’un ancien concept du pouvoir au début du XVIIIe siècle ottoman’, in (eds.) G. Grivaud and S. Petmezas, 
Byzantina et Moderna: Mélanges en l’honneur d’Hélène Antoniadis-Bibicou (Athens, n.d. [2007]), pp. 385-415; N. 
Sigalas, ‘Des histoires des Sultans à l’histoire de l’Etat. Une enquête sur le temps du pouvoir Ottoman (XVIe-
XVIIIe siècles)’, in (eds.) F. Georgeon and F. Hitzel, Les Ottomans et le temps (Leiden, 2011), pp. 99-127. 
67 AH, 12v, 5. 
68 KB, 93, 12. 
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of the salṭanat”,69 “in the period of his sublime salṭanat”.70 Just as often, however, they are 
invoked in pairs. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq usually paired them directly together in configurations such 
as “this great daulat and grand salṭanat” and “obtaining the daulat and salṭanat of the next 
world”.71 Koçi Bey tended instead to pair daulat with dīn (‘religion’), especially in the 
canonical form “dīn ve devlet”.72 Several other pairings are seen, like “devlet ve iḳbāl 
(fortune)”, “niʿmat (prosperity) va daulat” and “salṭanat va pādshāhī (sovereignty)”.73 But 
these are rare. Be they in isolation or in pairs, the two terms were associated with 
identifiable individuals or collectives, exemplified above all by the ruler and his dynasty. 
Gifts were carefully selected to be “appropriate for the consideration of the daulat of the 
presence of the sovereign”.74 The Ottoman dynasty (āl-ı ʿosm̱ān) was described as having “a 
great, exalted devlet”, and its princes (şahzādeler) were “the freshly ripe saplings and the 
new rose trees of the household (ḫāndān) of the sublime salṭanat”.75 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq put it 
most explicitly: God “granted human beings (ādimiyān) a daulat and a salṭanat. He gave to 
some daulat and salṭanat of this world and the next world, and to some He forbade both, and 
to some He gave one and not the other”.76 So, at any given moment in this world, there 
could be multiple daulats and salṭanats, which in principle were not a preserve of ruling 
elites and rulers alone. That knowledge impelled Koçi Bey to highlight qualitative 
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differences between the Islamic dominions (memālik-i islāmiyye) and “the rest of the 
devlets”.77 He went on to observe, “In whichever devlet oppression and bribery (rişvet) 
appear and are manifest, that devlet becomes ruined and destroyed”.78 For his part, ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq talked about “the wisdom (ḥikmat) [vested in] sovereigns and the elevation of the 
foundation of [their] salṭanat”.79 Both authors were open in acknowledging the existence of 
multiple daulats and salṭanats in the present. The past was no different in that respect. Koçi 
Bey gave prominence to those from the recent past, of the Safavid ruler ʿAbbās I (r. 1588-
1629) and of the Ottoman rulers Selim I (r. 1512-1520) and Süleyman I (r. 1520-1566).80 ʿAbd 
al-Ḥaqq preferred instead to highlight the general value of studying what past rulers and 
their officials had done that affected their daulat and salṭanat.81  
 
 How the two terms relate to one another is thrown into sharpest relief by 
considering entities characterised by both simultaneously. Doing so reveals daulat as a 
singular and indivisible state of being. It was possessed by particular individuals (arbāb-i 
daulat), with Iskandar’s daulat being proverbial.82At the same time, it projected beyond that 
individual, potentially to embrace others within its ambit. Those who did not possess it 
themselves could be “under [its] shadow”, “gather within [it]”, even “grow up in [it]”.83 It 
could be served by a variety of people, by Muslims at large, scholars, ministers, groups 
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specialised in particular forms of warfare, and local elites.84 It could be interfered with by 
“the intimates and servants” of the imperial household, and opposed by enemies from 
within or without.85 It could be harmed or troubled or ruined.86 Or it could be made durable, 
systematically organised and rendered auspicious.87 Daulat per se did not act; it just was. 
Actions for or against it were typically carried out by the more tangible salṭanat. Thus 
salṭanat could be in good order or it could be disrupted.88 It could have a firm basis and be 
strong, or it could be unstable and weak.89 Salṭanat was constructed from an array of visible 
elements. In concert, these formed its “building” or “workshop”.90 They are what enabled it 
to undertake given tasks rooted in this world, aided by fear and respect, by punishing and 
rewarding.91 
 
 Within the reasoning of the treatises, daulat and salṭanat function as measurable 
metrics or dimensions for ascertaining the prevailing situation in this world. That was the 
practical import of the terms; they offered a means of systematically comparing the various 
types of sovereign governance past and present, and so determine what could or should be 
changed in the author’s own polity. This of course only applied to that which fell within 
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man’s competence. Hence the significance of fortune, which defined the possibilities of 
human agency, or, in ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s words, “the scope of the circle of materials and 
tools”.92 The distinction between the scope of fortune and the scope of human agency was 
obviously crucial to the outcome of the day of judgement. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey were 
at one about this outcome being the supreme concern at the level of the individual. They 
maintained that the day of judgement is applicable to everyone. Given their avowed 
purpose, however, the authors made the point most forcefully for rulers. “The kings 
(mulūk) ... who are the just sovereigns (pādshāhān) ... gain recompense and reward in the 
next world. They become the gatherers of the pleasures of this world and the next world, 
and acquirers of the external and internal perfection”.93 By the same token, “if a tiny 
amount of oppression were to happen to an individual in one of the Islamic dominions, 
questions would be asked of [their] kings on the day of judgement. The ministers would not 
be asked”.94 Alongside this, and operating in a similar manner, Koçi Bey mentioned another 
form of judgement specific to the ruler. He argued that the ruler should be mindful of his 
worldly qualities and actions because of how posterity would judge him. If the ruler 
enabled justice and eradicated oppression, “fables of his sublime salṭanat will be composed 
in the languages [of the world] and his beautiful, auspicious works will be written about in 
the books of history and biographies”.95 So the ultimate goal for individuals was to pass the 
day of judgement well (and, for rulers especially, to be well remembered by posterity). 
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 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey highlighted two policies by means of which this goal 
could be achieved. One was to advance the cause of religion. Religion (dīn) was thus a signal 
concern, though without being overbearing. “All the community (ummat) has to join [the 
sovereigns] in supporting and promoting religion”, to “increase ... the luminosity of 
religion from day to day”.96 Guidance on this was available through “the divine law of the 
Prophets”, fidelity to which was enjoined.97 However, religion or divine law (sharīʿat/şerīʿat, 
sharʿ/şerʿ) were seldom marshalled in a narrow, juridical sense.98 Rather, they were 
marshalled for their capacity to act as a social glue. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq noted that “unity and 
agreement” within polities in the past resulted from “the orientation of society (jāmiʿah) 
[being] towards religion”.99 It also helped ensure that the everyday rights (ḥuqūq/ḥuḳūḳ) of 
subjects were protected, particularly over taxation and expenditure,100 as well as regarding 
privacy within the home (khānah) and punishment for transgressions by officials 
(ẓulm/ẓülm, fisād/fesād).101 Intriguingly, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, the jurist, rarely discussed religion or 
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divine law in terms of Islam per se, whereas Koçi Bey, the bureaucrat, made the link on 
several occasions, most explicitly through stock expressions such as “the divine law of 
Muḥammad” and “the religion of Muḥammad”.102  
 
 The second policy was to be just and promote justice. Justice was an umbrella 
concept which embraced equity and mercy, and extended to the removal or absence of 
oppression, assault and evil.103 Great emphasis is placed on these notions in both treatises. 
Just sovereigns were those who acted with “righteousness and kindness and care for 
subjects and equity, and obedience to and ensuring God’s will, and compassion and 
affection for the slaves of God (bandah-hā-yi khudā)”.104 More specifically, to undertake 
justice was to “repel oppression and violence from the people, and respect their rights, so 
that no one experiences violence and injustice, and the right of no one is trampled 
upon”.105 The authors recognised that pursuing justice could advance the cause of religion 
at the same time. But being just and promoting justice was certainly not confined to Islam 
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or, indeed, religion,106 for while “the world endures with unbelief (küfr), the world does not 
endure with oppression”.107 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq pointed out that the “ideal [of justice] is not a 
peculiarity of the religion of Islam (dīn-i islām) ... Anushirvan, whom they call the just, had 
this ideal. Although he was not a Muslim, he had justice (ʿadālat)”.108 Koçi Bey too invoked a 
pre-Islamic figure, in the form of Iskandar, as a laudable predecessor for the Ottoman 
emperor to compare himself to, particularly as a military leader. If the Ottoman army were 
appropriately reformed, then “like Iskandar’s, the sword of Islam would be capable of 
reaching from world’s end to world’s end”.109 In invoking the Safavid ruler ʿAbbās I, Koçi 
Bey drew attention to a non-Sunni—and to his mind heretical—figure much closer to the 
present. Even one as beyond the pale as ʿAbbās offered lessons for the Ottomans: despite 
“being irreligion (bī-dīn) and uncivilised (bī-mürüvvet), by virtue of undertaking justice and 
equity, in this fashion the [Safavid] Shah will become eternal”.110 
 
 To implement these general policies, the treatises focus on two matters grounded in 
this world: prosperity and order. If the day of judgement was the ultimate goal at the level 
of the individual, then these two matters, which Koçi Bey tended to gloss as maṣlaḥat,111 
were the ultimate goals to which their empire was—or should be—oriented. Much of Koçi 
Bey’s advice turned on increasing the prosperity of the Islamic dominions (memālik-i 
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islāmiyye)112 and that of the imperial daulat.113 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq argued that rulers ought to 
show a concern for “temporal prosperity” and strive to “bring about an increase in ... the 
prosperity of the provinces (vilāyat)”.114 This was best facilitated through gainful business, 
“the workshop of existence and [the reason for] the durability of the world”.115 Because 
“sovereigns [have in their] power and care ... the business (kārūbār) of ordinary people”, he 
urged the Mughal emperor and his highest officials to do whatever necessary “for the busy-
ness (mashghūlī) of the world and for [its] success”.116 As prosperity depended on the world 
being suitably ordered (intiẓām, niẓām), unsurprisingly the matter of order took up much of 
ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s and Koçi Bey’s attention.117 Order encompassed “the important affairs” of 
their world, of ordinary people and of the regimes presiding over them.118 It was a 
capacious notion, with several intersecting attributes. These attributes are discussed in the 
treatises in either a positive or negative vein, one to foster, the other to prevent: 
 
Attributes of order 
To foster To prevent 
stability, repose, permanence  insecurity, upheaval, decline 
obedience, submission opposition, rebellion 
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victory, conquest, expansion defeat, loss, contraction 
 
 The progress that had been made towards reaching these goals, and the distance 
that remained to be covered, was measurable through the present state of the daulat 
and/or salṭanat in question. Reducing the distance and making further progress was 
predicated on collective action and co-ordination.119 In both treatises, the benefits of 
collective action are set off against the actions of individuals working in isolation. ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq put it in the form of a simile: “Whatever a [single] person may bring about cannot 
have other than what relation a drop has to an ocean”.120 Koçi Bey made the same point in a 
historical register: “A man [on his own] cannot perform the service suited to religion and 
devlet. And he cannot conquer a country, not even a village. For many centuries previously, 
men conquered only by being an intimate of the sovereign”.121 As for coordination, this 
amounted to the various parts of the body social fulfilling their designated, valued roles. 
“Scholars [have to] circulate knowledge and explain divine law, and the dervishes have to 
perform the ceremonies and worship, and soldiers have to be engaged in warfare and 
struggle, still more the others, the artisans and craftsmen”.122 The alternative was “Muslims 
(ümmat-i Muḥammad) say ‘myself, myself’, [and] the people are completely ruined”.123 
 
*** 
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 Though universal knowledge permeates and renders coherent the overall 
reasoning, we seldom see explicit discussion of it in the two treatises, or of the ultimate 
goals related to it. By far the greatest portion of each is devoted to what in this world fell 
within the domain of human agency and so was “capable of being made sound (ṣalāḥ-peẕīr)” 
through recourse to “materials and tools”.124 Of special utility for this was temporal 
knowledge, which, as both authors indicated, was widely dispersed. According to ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq, 
 
all created beings (khalāʾiq) need reason (ʿaql), and reason needs experience (tajribah), and for 
experiences a long period is necessary and a long life and free time and ease of mind. So when the sages 
of the world saw that the length of the transitory life does not suffice for that, they devised a remedy and 
made a plan to constrain this loss and compensate for this privation. So they recorded in books and 
chronicles the news of the rulers (mulūk va salāṭīn) and the circumstances of the nobles (umarāʾ) and 
ministers (vuzarāʾ) and the words of the scholars (ʿulamāʾ) and philosophers (hukamāʾ). And they put 
down in writing the stories and annals of those who lived in the past for the benefit of those to come 
[and] to rouse the heedless ones ... That which is not acquired concerning the properties of the world 
(rūzgār) and the properties of the time (zamānah) and their people (ahl) through experiences and choices 
over the length of a long life and after undertaking long and distant journeys and associating with 
different sorts of people and measuring their actions and works—in a short time [all this] is acquired 
[through the aforesaid writings]. The wise man (ʿāqil) must not be deprived of the share of lessons and 
expertise (ʿibrat va khibrat), and must balance it up for himself and his own circumstances.125 
 
This temporal knowledge was necessary for effective sovereign governance. The treatises 
distil the “lessons and expertise” contained within it for the purposes of high-level 
decision-making and implementation by describing the character of this world and its most 
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significant parts, and the ends to which they should be directed. For convenience, I label 
these parts the polity, general population, regime, elites and ruler, and examine them 
below in turn. 
 
 As ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey conceived it, their ambient polities were structured 
by a number of basic endowments, patterns, actors and mechanisms, and the systemic 
relationships between them. The territories their polities straddled were ‘Islamic domains’ 
populated by what are variously termed banī ādam/benī ādem, adamiyān, merdān and ricāl. 
These terms are used synonymously, and may be thought of as human beings at large.126 
For ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, human beings were internally distinguished by particular combinations 
of daulat and salṭanat.127 It appears that these characteristics could rarely, if ever, be 
acquired by an individual (or collective) through his own effort or choice; typically, they 
were inherited genetically or conferred from above. They could also be lost. This underlay 
Koçi Bey’s lament that in the current situation “the most sublime [people] stay in 
abjectness, the lowest reach the devlet”.128 The great majority of human beings were placed 
within the category of the general population (jamʿiyyat, khalq/ḫalḳ, ʿāmmah-i khalāʾiq, 
ʿāmme-i ḫalḳ, ḫalḳ-ı ʿālem),129 most of whom were peasants (raʿīyat, reʿāyā).130 Alongside 
peasants, the treatises note the presence of free individuals not directly bound to the land 
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(barāyā/berāyā).131 These encompassed craftsmen, tradesmen and shopkeepers (arbāb-i 
ṣanʿāt, ahl-i ḥirf, ehl-i sūḳ),132 with glancing references to merchants (bāzergān, maḳūle-i māl ve 
menāl).133 For both authors, scholars (ʿulamāʾ/ʿulemāʾ), clerics (ʿulemāʾ-ı dīn) and dervishes 
(darvīshān) formed highly significant groups of individuals,134 who, through their “care for 
the condition of peasants and free individuals”, had one foot within the general 
population.135 Prominence was given to the imperial army (lashkar/leşker, ʿasker),136 which 
Koçi Bey much more than ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq evoked in an Islamic tenor as “the army of Islam” 
or “the sword of Islam”, or as composed of “religious warriors”.137 As for the centre of the 
Mughal and Ottoman polities, it was constituted by the elites, a subset of whom furnished 
the sovereign decision-makers and implementers. 
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 While there are several differences in detail, the image that ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi 
Bey had of their polity was marked by a similar four-fold division.138 Even if the lion’s share 
of their attention was taken up by the army and the elites, both argued that all these 
components of the polity were crucial for each other’s daulat and/or salṭanat, performing 
distinctive yet mutually reinforcing roles.139 In ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s account, “the cause for the 
revenue collection of the treasury is the tranquillity of the peasantry, and the cause for the 
assembling of the army is the treasury ... And in truth in the same way that the treasury is 
the cause for the assembling of the army, the assembling of the army also is the cause for 
the treasury, because however-so-much the assembled army conquers more countries and 
increases the [regime’s] dominions, the revenue of the treasury becomes greater”.140 
Likewise, Koçi Bey pointed out that “the strength and glory of the sublime salṭanat is on 
account of the army and the durability of the army is on account of the treasury. And the 
revenue collection of the treasury is on account of peasants. And the durability of peasants 
is on account of justice and equity”.141 The relationship between these components was 
envisaged either mechanically, with the ruler at the apex as “the upholder and preserver of 
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this chain”,142 or organically, with the ruler as the spirit or heart and the surrounding polity 
as the body.143  
 
 Neither ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq nor Koçi Bey spent much time on the general population in its 
own right. Whether as free individuals or as peasants, it figures mainly in relation to the 
elites or the ruler. Both authors were of the opinion that the general population ought to 
be a primary concern of sovereign governance. “May all the people ... be under the shadow 
of this great daulat and grand salṭanat”, wrote ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq.144 Koçi Bey echoed this 
sentiment. “The peasants and free individuals will be put in a condition of ease [when 
officials] protect and guard their own peasants as they do their children”.145 If properly 
managed, the general population would then have a value “akin to gold and silver and 
copper”.146 This value was facilitated by there being dispersed among the general 
population knowledge suited to its station within the polity. Some of this was contained in 
“books of warning (ʿibrat-nāmah) for the people”, a repository of exemplary behaviour, 
buttressed by anecdotes from earlier generations.147 Some was preserved by religious 
scholars who by tradition “were engaged in learning in [their] homes [and] those who went 
out either to a lesson or to the mosque or on pilgrimage”.148 The general population was 
subdivided by the authors into smaller categories, such as “the class (zumrah) of the people 
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of Islam”, “the classes (zümreler) of yeomen and heralds and scribes”, “the orders (aṣnāf) of 
created beings”.149 Because each had, according to Koçi Bey, a capacity for undertaking both 
“admirable acts” and “wicked acts”, these groups needed to be monitored with care.150  
 
 The general population stood apart from the regime proper, even as both depended 
on one another. That is because “[only] through freedom from care and welfare of the 
condition and ease of mind in the period [are peasants] busy in agriculture and bring about 
an increase in the produce of the land and the necessary wealth (māl). And this will cause 
an increase of the treasury”.151 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq distinguished between “the special (khāṣṣ) and 
the common (ʿāmm)” people, which paralleled Koçi Bey’s distinction between those “inside 
(īç) and outside (ṭaşra)”.152 The significance of this distinction was that, when a special one 
lost his position inside the regime, even “if he were capable of [another] occupation 
(ṣanʿat)”, he would not be “suited to mixing with the occupation of peasants”.153 
Fundamentally what separated the two sides is that the general population did not have 
salṭanat. Furthermore, its plural nature meant that free individuals (and perhaps the 
peasants as well) were organised laterally in their specialised occupations, be they as 
tailors, grocers or druggists.154 These qualities marked the general population off from the 
Mughal and Ottoman regimes, which in contrast were characterised by both salṭanat and a 
visible hierarchy. 
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 The Mughal and Ottoman regimes had a definite centre. It was at once physical and 
relational. For ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, the physical centre was the “unsullied area (khiṭṭah) of Delhi”, 
within which was located “the abode (maqarr) of the community of the intimates of the 
court (dargāh)”.155 For Koçi Bey, the physical centre pivoted on the “threshold (āsitāne) of 
auspiciousness” and the “door (der) of the devlet”.156 For both, the ruler was the relational 
focal point of the regime. This regime was built out of several basic resources, on which 
ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey generally concurred. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s treatise gives the more 
explicit account of its construction. At the regime’s core were “the pillars (arkān) of the 
salṭanat ... the building of the house of the salṭanat has four pillars (sutūn) [and] if one of 
them does not exist this building falls and is not capable of solidity. One is the treasury 
(khazīnah). The second is the army (lashkar). The third is agreement (ittifāq) within the 
army. The fourth is justice (ʿadl) and removal of oppression and violence (ẓulm va sitam) 
over the people”.157 The principal actors in this were the treasury and the army, and the 
principal mechanisms agreement and justice.158 Koçi Bey likewise mentioned the treasury 
and the army as actors core to his regime, and justice as one of the key mechanisms.159 The 
other mechanism, however, took the form of being worthy (ehl) or entitled (müstaḥıḳḳ). 
This is a notable difference, and shaped how each author addressed the urgent problems 
confronting the Mughal and Ottoman empires in the early seventeenth century. But if we 
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take the reasoning as a whole, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s agreement mechanism operates in a similar 
way to Koçi Bey’s worthy/entitled mechanism. Moreover, both these mechanisms, 
facilitated by a particular kind of knowledge (ʿilm),160 sought the same ends: to foster an 
effective imperial army and obedience to sovereign decrees.161 That suggests a functional 
equivalence between them.  
 
 These actors and mechanisms were situated within a hierarchy, with various bi-
directional linkages between them. “Each of [them] differs in strength (quvvat) and degree 
(martabah)”, which for ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq defined their relative positions.162 He argued that “the 
army is a stronger pillar than the treasury [,] agreement within the army is a stronger pillar 
than the existence of the army [,] but justice and the removal of oppression and violence is 
stronger than agreement”.163 For Koçi Bey, the actors, who included the gentlemen of 
learning and wisdom, government managers and collectors, prebendal cavalrymen and 
janissaries of the standing army, were marked by their degree (mertebe).164 When in office, 
they occupied a specific rank (manṣab). Buttressed by canonical tradition, it is “obligatory 
and important for both the ranks of divine law and government (şerīʿat ve ḥükūmet) and the 
ranks of the sword and punishment (seyf ve siyāset) to be given to those worthy of them 
(ehl)”.165 Perhaps the most substantive difference between the two treatises over the 
regime’s hierarchy concerns the relative positions of the treasury and the army. While Koçi 
Bey did not openly elevate one over the other, the latter was accorded more importance by 
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ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq. He justified it as follows: “What if supposedly there is the treasury and not 
the army. [Then] the goal and aim of the salṭanat ... are not obtained. [But] if there is the 
army and not the treasury, this goal is capable of being obtained”. However, he was quick 
to concede that “if there are both, certainly it would be the most perfect and complete 
[situation], and the goal is obtained more quickly and completely”.166  
 
 The elites of the Mughal and Ottoman regimes formed a corporate body.167 ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq described the Mughal elites as “the people of daulat and salṭanat” and “the intimates 
(muqarribān) of the court (dargāh)”. Among them figured grandees (kabāʾir) and nobles 
(khavāṣṣ, khāṣṣigān), as well as “the attendants (mulazimān) of the court”.168 Koçi Bey 
described the Ottoman elites as composed of scholars (ʿulemāʾ), slaves (ḳūllar), ministers 
(vüzerāʾ) and “the people of the court” (ehl-i dīvān), together with “the inside people (īç 
ḫalḳı)” of the imperial household, embracing intimates (muḳarrebān), boon-companions 
(nüdemāʾ, müṣāḥebān) and servants (ḫüdemāʾ).169 In addition, there were metropolitan 
“grandees and notables (ekābir ve aʿyān)”, with their own households and dependents 
(tevābiʿ, müteʿalliḳāt).170 Both authors envisaged these elites as organised into a hierarchy 
calibrated, as noted above, by degree or rank. With their positions came specified duties 
and rights. Because members of the elites had the capacity, acquired through birth or 
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conferred from on high, to affect lives within the general population, quite naturally it was 
from this group that “leaders and commanders (āmir va raʾīs) [emerged] who manage and 
govern and improve the state [of] human beings”.171 Their basic duty (farż-ı ʿayn, ʿayn-ı farż) 
was to make sovereign decisions and, what is more, ensure their implementation (amr/emr, 
kār, īş, maṣlaḥat).172 These decisions could be in keeping with existing practice, especially 
where it was good (ḍabṭ/żabṭ, siyāsat/siyāset, tadbīr/tedbīr).173 But if the situation fell short of 
the ideal, the authors advised changes in the form of remedies (ʿilāj/ʿilāc, chārah/çāre, 
davā/devā), preparations (tadāruk/tedārük), improvements (iṣlāḥ) or corrections (taṣḥīḥ).174 
In recompense for carrying out their duties, the ruling elites had certain privileges or 
rights (ḥaqq/ḥaḳḳ). These entailed an appropriate level of income or its equivalent.175 The 
source for this was, of course, the surplus produced by the general population which 
entered the regime’s purview. That is why Koçi Bey urged the Ottoman ruler not to allow 
the wealth of the general treasury held in trust for the people (beytü’l-māl) to be wasted,176 
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and why ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq urged the Mughal ruler to spend that wealth and the wealth of his 
privy purse not just wisely but generously, too. 177 
 
 Both treatises emphasise that not all members of the elites, let alone the population 
at large, were suited to sovereign governance. Sovereign governance ought to be in the 
hands of those endowed with certain personal qualities (khaṣlat)178 and free of undesirable 
others.179 This accounts for the antipathy of the authors towards interference in the affairs 
of daulat and salṭanat by metropolitan grandees and notables, or by those belonging to the 
imperial household and their clients.180 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq blamed Mughal grandees as “the 
cause of the iniquities and perversion of religion and the world”.181 Koçi Bey for his part 
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distinguished repeatedly between the worthy (ehl) and unworthy (nā-ehl), and between the 
entitled (müstaḥıḳḳ) and unentitled (nā-müstaḥıḳḳ). This was in accord with his argument 
that government positions should be allocated to those suited to them because of their 
biological patrimony or because of their institutionalised apprenticeship. To his mind, 
these were the sole objective and tried-and-trusted grounds for recruitment of officials to 
man the civil and military machinery of the Ottoman empire. Koçi Bey’s stress on a current 
or would-be official’s lineage or ethnicity (cins, aṣl, neseb, ḥaseb, millet), or that individual’s 
training or education (yol, ṭarīḳ, sebīl, icāzet, istiʿdād, hüner), went hand-in-hand with his 
condemnation of patronage (şefāʿat), auctions (mezād) and bribes (rişvet, irtişāʾ) as 
alternative mechanisms for recruitment.182 Though without the pointed insistence, ʿAbd al-
Ḥaqq broadly agreed with Koçi Bey, arguing against “the training of base people” for 
officialdom.183 Both authors also agreed on the value of knowledge for the ruling elites to 
enable them to exercise their reason (ʿaql/ʿaḳl). Koçi Bey castigated those who lacked 
knowledge or were ignorant,184 flagging the importance of prior experience at lower levels 
for official positions in the metropole.185 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was keen that “those present in the 
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court ... hear the words of the great ones of the people of religion and the biographies of 
the justly ruling sovereigns”.186 To that end, digests in the form of dastūr al-ʿamals had been 
composed “for the nobles and the sultans on the face of the world”.187 The supreme value of 
studying such material was that the ruling elites would then be able to 
 
infer and acquire ... three things: first, attentiveness to what [past ruling elites] did which affected the 
daulat and the salṭanat; and [second], what caused the durability of the daulat and the arrangement of the 
important affairs of the salṭanat; and [third], what was the reason for [their] decline and disorder (zavāl 
va ikhtilāl). This learning and wisdom is sufficient for rulers. More is not necessary.188 
 
 The treatises were dedicated to the reigning emperors - Jahangir and Murad IV - 
whom the authors hoped to count among their readers. It is hardly surprising therefore 
that ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey took care to direct and relate their remarks to the ruler. But 
there is another reason why the ruler was at the centre of their concerns. It is to do with 
how a ruler was understood as being systemically integrated into this world. Both treatises 
evidence a positive correlation between the ruler’s goodness (ṣalāḥ) or badness 
(fasād/fesād), and the goodness or badness of the regime’s pillars and population.189 
Analogous arguments are presented for there being a positive correlation between the 
safety (amān) of the ruler’s person and the safety of his religion and kingdom,190 and 
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between the ruler being good (ṣāliḥ) and the world’s order being good.191 Such correlations 
gave heft to the notion that “the very being of sovereigns is an influential talisman”.192 
 
 These correlations resonated with the ruler’s jurisdiction over sovereign 
governance, and account for the duties and rights uniquely vested in him. Rulers were, of 
course, the exemplary possessors of both daulat and salṭanat.193 It was they who had final 
responsibility for sustaining the livelihoods of their subjects and for handling the principal 
affairs of their polity.194 This necessitated “putting the weight of the people on [themselves] 
and leaving aside [their] ease and repose and being dedicated to the comfort of the 
people”.195 They “must be busy working for the people during the day and [only] at night 
[may they work] for themselves”.196 Such burdens were matched, and rendered 
manageable, by a ruler’s peerless authority. He undertook “the matters of government and 
sovereignty ... as the pivot of the actions of [his] reign and leadership and command and 
rule”.197 There was no one like the ruler in being able to “order someone anywhere [and 
for] the barrier to be absent”.198 Indeed, “if [the ruler] orders the kings to be attentive to 
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goodness, the world from head to foot will find order. If he directs [them] to badness, the 
situation will become vexed”.199 Alongside these maxims, the treatises mention key 
principles for facilitating effective decision-making and implementation at the apex of the 
regime. The most crucial of these, remarked upon especially by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, was 
mediation (tavassuṭ) or equilibrium (iʿtidāl) between, for example, fear and hope among the 
ruler’s soldiers, and too little and too much coordination among his officials.200 To make 
and implement the decisions expected of him, the ruler also needed to have particular 
qualities and knowledge. There is little discussion of these in Koçi Bey’s treatise beyond 
noting the usefulness of fishing, hunting, walking and riding for a ruler’s well-being, and of 
staying abreast of the current situation by, say, holding court in person, questioning his 
companions and receiving unhindered petitions from his subjects.201 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was 
more expansive. In addition to having the manners (ādāb) appropriate to sovereignty and 
accurate, up-to-date information about his regime,202 the success or otherwise of a ruler’s 
reign depended on “the strength of [his] intellect”.203 For this, he needed to “reflect on the 
works of rules and regulations (qavāʿid va qavānīn) concerning moderation and tranquillity 
(maʿdalat va amnīyat) ... and keep in view the biographies of the just sovereigns, and listen 
to their stories and reports, and make the mind accord with divine law and desire follow 
religion”.204 By doing so, he would become “the just, pious sovereign”. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq 
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reserved the greatest praise for such a ruler, expressing and embodying the ultimate goals 
to which his regime and polity were oriented.205 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Through the prism of sovereign governance within the region at the time, the 
findings of this article shed new light on the history of early modern South Asia and the 
Middle East. The specific findings—to do with, among others, religion, justice, prosperity, 
order, experience, scholarship, peasants, free individuals, the treasury, the army, 
hierarchy, official recruitment—are detailed within the analysis of the previous section. 
Amidst them, however, are two of a more general nature, which merit elaboration. The first 
derives from the striking extent to which the treatises of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey concur 
on the reigning conditions of routine, high-level governance at the centre of the Mughal 
and Ottoman empires in the early seventeenth century. These similarities are all the more 
striking for being unexpected. In several respects, the situations of the Mughal and 
Ottoman metropoles at the time were in marked contrast to one another. That contrast is 
reflected in the different clusters of problems stressed in the two treatises and the 
solutions discussed to address them. Furthermore, the biographies of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and 
Koçi Bey are very different. And yet notwithstanding these differences the description of 
the structures conditioning the empires are broadly the same. This is clear evidence in 
favour of the thesis that the similarities between the two treatises result from views 
independently held in common by their authors. It also points towards their views being 
widely dispersed within the region of the Mughal and Ottoman empires, and being taken 
seriously by those with a manifest stake in sovereign governance.  
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 Of course, the forgoing begs the question of how to account for the striking 
similarities between these treatises. One reason must lie in the enormous prestige of the 
Perso-Islamic literary canon throughout the region, with which elites of all kinds (and 
perhaps non-elites too) were expected to be familiar.206 Another stems from the 
overlapping genealogy of core elements of the Mughal and Ottoman governing 
machineries, perhaps most famously the prebendal jāgīr and the tīmār with common roots 
in the Seljuk-era iqṭāʿ.207 These reasons have been marshalled by scholars in support of the 
position that treatises such as ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s and Koçi Bey’s lacked innovation.208 They, so 
the argument goes, drew on a collective well of mostly inherited notions. But this 
judgement is hasty; it is asserted rather than substantiated. There are in fact promising 
grounds for an alternative position. This is based on the twinned observation that, even as 
the meanings of these notions changed over time, at any given moment contemporaries 
like ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey invoked them because, in their particular configuration, 
they were deemed relevant for their immediate milieu. Unfortunately, we have little more 
than informed speculation about how the meanings ascribed to these notions in the early 
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208 E.g., R. Murphey, ‘Solakzade’s Treatise of 1652: A Glimpse at operational principles guiding the Ottoman 
state during times of crisis’, in V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İkitisat Tarihi Kongresi, Tebliğler (Ankara, 1990): p. 
32. 
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seventeenth century compare with before and after within the region; the whole matter is 
in sore need of far greater attention than it has received thus far.209 
 
 The matter is linked to a third—and perhaps the most intriguing—rationale for the 
similarities between the treatises. It pivots on the category of empire to which those of 
Mughals and Ottomans belonged, and on the phase in the region’s history in which they 
found themselves in the early seventeenth century.210 Both their empires were composites, 
with layered governance, and provinces ruled indirectly. They were territorial, agrarian, 
extensive and contiguous. They presided over highly plural populations which lived at 
considerable remove from the metropole, and with which they interacted episodically via 
an array of intermediaries. They had consolidated bureaucratic-military institutions at the 
centre. And in their ruling ideology they were unbounded, world dominating and peerless. 
Given these commonalities, one might expect the framing concepts, images and principles 
of sovereign governance—the art of governance—to be similar across the empires. This 
reasoning, avowedly typological in character, dovetails with a historical argument.211  
                                                        
209 The possibilities of research of this type are shown by M. Alam, The Languages of Political Islam in India, 1200-
1800 (Chicago, 2004); L. T. Darling, ‘Political change and political discourse in the early modern Mediterranean 
world’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38:4 (2008), pp. 505-531; N. Yavari, Advice for the Sultan: Prophetic Voices 
and Secular Politics in Medieval Islam (London, 2014). 
210 For a stimulating typology of empires, see H. Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient 
Rome to the United States (Cambridge, 2007). There now exist several book-length studies of the Mughal and 
Ottoman empires in a comparative vein, most notably S. F. Dale’s The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids 
and Mughals (Cambridge, 2010) and D. E. Streusand’s Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals 
(Boulder, 2011). But the region qua region remains a desiderata in this literature. 
211 The historical argument is expanded upon in a forthcoming essay, ‘From decline to colonialism, or an era 
of unscripted possibilities? Sovereign Governance in South Asia and the Middle East’. 
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 From a regional perspective, there were remarkable parallels in the kaleidoscope of 
sovereign regimes which succeeded one another in northern India and the eastern 
Mediterranean between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. That succession was 
marked by distinct, roughly coterminous phases. The one in which ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi 
Bey were embedded was the ‘imperial’ phase, lasting from the middle of the sixteenth to 
the late seventeenth centuries. This was the phase in which the Mughal and Ottoman 
regimes unquestionably became world empires, attaining their greatest physical reach. 
Developments in this phase were moulded by mutual dependencies between the region’s 
‘centre-of-gravity’ polities in northern India and the eastern Mediterranean, and ‘hub’ 
polities around the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.212 Each polity thus had a sui generis 
relationship to contemporary global flows and interactions, while performing distinct roles 
in a shared regional world. The polities of the Mughal and Ottoman metropoles in the early 
seventeenth century were no exception to this. Their particular situation is flagged in this 
article by the specific solutions which were proposed, attempted or enacted to the set of 
problems considered especially pressing or significant at the time. But such differences 
were of degree, not of kind, because, as shown by the analysis of the two treatises, the 
structures known to govern decision-making and implementation by the ruling elites were 
strikingly similar.  
 
 The typological-historical rationale above is presented as a hypothesis. It may be 
tested (and elaborated) in two ways. Adopting mutatis mutandis the approach of this article, 
one is to reconstruct the art of governance in the citied, literate and commercialised 
polities of China and Europe, and compare the results for insights into their specific 
                                                        
212 This conception of polities with a region is adapted from Christian, Maps of Time, pp. 291-293. 
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trajectories.213 A second way is to use the findings of this article to identify the notions—
say, business, class, entitlement, duty, corruption, equilibrium, foreigner, grandee, 
inside/outside—most actively in play within the globalisation in which the sovereign 
regimes of the three regions were enmeshed, so as to recapture the cognitive dimensions of 
its historical circulations, exchanges, blockages and oppositions. 
 
 Turning to the article’s second general finding, this stems from the emphasis placed 
on daulat and salṭanat in the treatises. How these terms are invoked leaves no doubt that 
the authors considered them foundational. For both ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey, daulat and 
salṭanat functioned as measurable metrics or dimensions onto which the current situation 
of their regime, and the broader polity, could be collapsed, and therefore compared with 
that of other daulats and salṭanats, past and present. This enabled the current situation to 
be evaluated systematically for possible future action. Conceptually, daulat and salṭanat 
were formative for the author’s description of sovereign governance and the ends to which 
it was—or should be—oriented. By extension, they were formative for understandings of 
sovereign governance dispersed within the region more broadly. Without giving daulat and 
salṭanat their due as rooted, generative concepts, the arguments of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq and Koçi 
                                                        
213 On China, see W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (eds.), Historians of China and Japan (London, 1961); P. K. 
Bol, “This Culture of Ours": Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China (Stanford, 1992); D. M. Robinson (ed.), 
Culture, Courtiers, and Competition: The Ming court (1368-1644) (Cambridge, 2008). On Europe, see W. Ullmann, Law 
and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political Ideas (London, 1975); Q. Skinner, 
The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols (Cambridge, UK, 1978); R. Tuck, ‘History of political thought’, 
in (ed.) P. Burke, New Perspectives on Historical Writing (2nd edition, Cambridge, 2001 [1991]), pp. 218-232; W. 
Weber, ‘“What a good ruler should not do”: Theoretical limits of royal power in European theories of 
absolutism, 1500-1700’, Sixteenth Century Journal 4:1 (1995), pp. 897-915; S. Stuurman, ‘The canon of the history 
of political thought: Its critique and a proposed alternative’, History & Theory 39:2 (2002), pp. 147-166. 
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Bey do not cohere.214 But modern scholarship on either the Mughal empire or the Ottoman 
empire has yet to do this. To wit, neither daulat nor salṭanat are defined in the glossaries or 
entered in the indices of any of the standard reference works on these regimes.215 Where 
the terms are mentioned in the main text, they are simply translated as, or used 
synonymously for, ‘state’ or ‘empire’. As the analysis of this article argues, to do that is to 
distort or misinterpret their meanings profoundly, and of the ambient reasoning within 
which they are invoked. 
 
 Daulat and salṭanat are salient to the longstanding debate over the historical nature 
and role of the state. That is the imperative for giving them their due as concepts. 
Throughout this article, the term ‘state’ has been eschewed in favour of the more open-
ended terms ‘polity’ and ‘regime’, which can be related more faithfully to the sources 
examined. By doing so, the resulting analysis is less likely to prejudge sovereign 
governance in the Mughal and Ottoman metropoles in the early seventeenth century. 
Because of the heavily modernist and Europe-centred connotations of the state as a 
concept, making a priori use of it would have veiled the historically consequential 
structures framing the art of governance. Nevertheless, the state will at some point have to 
                                                        
214 For the socio-political importance of concepts in history, particularly for their bearing on the relationship 
between the future-oriented horizon of expectation and the past-oriented horizon of experience, see R. 
Koselleck’s essays in his Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, 1985; new edition, New 
York, 2004) and The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford, 2002). 
215 Those sampled include I. Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707 (3rd edition, London, 2013 
[1963]); T. Raychaudhuri and I. Habib (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. 1, c. 1200 - c. 1750 
(Cambridge, 1982); H. İnalcık and D. Quataert (eds.), Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 
(Cambridge, 1994); S. N. Faroqhi (ed.), Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 
(Cambridge, 2006). 
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be brought back in.216 This is because the mainstream paradigms and narratives, above all 
those vested in European Exceptionalism and the Rise of the West, hinge on the entity. 
They make influential claims about premodern states and their modern heirs, about the 
relationship of different types of states to their societies, and about the influence of states 
on the specific paths to modernity embarked upon around the world.217 However, in 
bringing back the state, we must move beyond hoary nostrums like the centrality of ‘the 
circle of justice’ to governance or the absence of a theory of the state within the region in 
premodern times.218 These nostrums might well be true, but merely in a trivial sense. More 
apropos, they are insidious in that they help perpetuate the logic of decline in apprehending 
the region’s history in moving from precolonial to colonial times. The art of governance 
                                                        
216 This echoes the famous plea made in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State 
Back In (Cambridge, 1985). 
217 Current thinking on the state and state systems in the period is surveyed in P. H. H. Vries, ‘Governing 
growth: A comparative analysis of the role of the state in the rise of the West’, Journal of World History 13:1 
(2002), pp. 67-138. It should be noted that the article’s chief focus is on western Europe. For a more global 
perspective, see M. N. Pearson, ‘Merchants and states’, in (ed.) J. D. Tracy, The Political Economy of Merchant 
Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 41-116. 
218 As typical examples holding to these nostrums, see B. Turnaoǧlu, The Formation of Turkish Republicanism 
(Princeton, 2017); S. S. Alvi, ‘Religion and state during the reign of Mughal Emperor Jahangir (1605-27): 
Nonjuristical perspectives’, Studia Islamica 69 (1989): pp. 100-105. Recently, however, a few tentative steps 
have been taken to move beyond such nostrums. Most noteworthy are N. Sigalas, ‘Devlet et etat: du 
glissement sémantique d’un ancien concept du pouvoir au début du XVIIIe siècle ottoman’, in (eds.) G. 
Grivaud and S. Petmezas, Byzantina et Moderna: Mélanges en l’honneur d’Hélène Antoniadis-Bibicou (Athens, n.d. 
[2007]), pp. 385-415; N. Sigalas, ‘Des histoires des Sultans à l’histoire de l’Etat. Une enquête sur le temps du 
pouvoir ottoman (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)’, in (eds.) F. Georgeon and F. Hitzel, Les Ottomans et le temps (Leiden, 
2011), pp. 99-127; M. Sariyannis, ‘Ruler and state, state and society in Ottoman political thought’, Turkish 
Historical Review 4 (2013), pp. 83-117. 
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was a highly evolved field in South Asia and the Middle East, operating on both theoretical 
and practical planes, each in dialogue with the other. And at the heart of this field lay daulat 
and salṭanat. The state is to be discerned within the nexus formed by them.  
 
 Stepping back from the findings, there is a larger issue raised by the very presence 
of this article: Why does it represent the first systematic attempt to analyse in 
juxtaposition Mughal and Ottoman sources on the art of governance? While the availability 
of pertinent sources and the necessary linguistic wherewithal admittedly pose major 
challenges, they are far from the whole explanation. The main reasons lie elsewhere; they 
are less to do with the workaday practicalities of research and more to do with the horizons 
within which that research has traditionally been carried out and the hitherto prevailing 
methodologies. Historiographically, these horizons have been narrow or broad, obscuring 
the shared region of the Mughal and Ottoman empires in favour of the imperial polity 
looking inwards or of the European world economy looking outwards. This has fostered 
interpretations which are unwittingly anachronistic and ethnocentric (be it of the 
idiosyncratic variety or of the eurocentric). In these interpretations, many features of the 
treatises analysed in this article have at worst been dismissed as rhetoric or at best 
confined to the realm of discourse.219 The analysis of this article parts company with the 
received historiography by embracing an avowedly regional perspective. But to transcend 
the unwitting anachronisms and ethnocentrisms, and so get at the consequential 
developments, parting company is not enough; an appropriate set of heuristics is required 
to differentiate between historical constants and historical contingencies. This set 
underlies the conditions-problems model deployed for analysing the treatises by ʿAbd al-
                                                        
219 These points are elaborated in the discussion of Mughal and Ottoman historiography in the opening 
section of the article. 
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Ḥaqq and Koçi Bey. That, in concert with the regional perspective, constitutes the approach 
of this article. If the novelty and value of the findings generated by it gain acceptance, then 
they and their approach raise the prospect of furnishing a more robust basis for future 
research that aims to recapture the character and trajectories of the sovereign regimes 
populating South Asia and the Middle East, and thereby the region’s role in the global 
genesis of the modern world. 
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